SA

http://wiki.keithl.com/SA

Is Ukraine Like Hitler's Brownshirts?

The German Freikorps were volunteer paramilitary German militias that fought as mercenaries in Europe between the 1750s until World War 1. After 1918, "Freikorps" were mostly war veteran paramilitary groups of anticommunist war veterans, 500,000 formal members and 1,500,000 informal participants.

In 1921, Freikorps leader Gerhard Roßbach outfitted 81 of his men with surplus beige-brown shirts and ties for a 1921 bicycle ride to East Prussia, and later adopted by Hitler's Brownshirts aka Sturmabteilung (Storm Division), initially recruited from the Freikorps.

Roßbach joined the Berlin Nazi party, took part in the 1923 Munich Beer Hall Putsch, and helped Hitler organize the Sturmabteilung. Roßbach was arrested but not killed during Hitler's 1934 Night of the Long Knives purge of the SA, including the murder of SA leader Ernst Röhm on 1934 July 1.

After the purge, the SA declined by more than 40%, mostly deployed to attack Jews, such as the November 1938 Kristallnacht pogrom against German Jews. In 1939, what was left of the SA became the Wehrmannschaften training school for the Wehrmacht.

The Wehrmannschaften is partly described in the 1948 Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals book:

• page 139: After 30 June 1934 the SA sank into complete insignificance. After 30 June 1934 the SA was regarded as a disagreeable appendage. The SA was considered politically unreliable. Therefore, as was repeatedly established by the testimony of witnesses before the Commission, it was not given any further duties. The SA's destiny from that day on was nothing but the search for a task. Officially the SA was supposed to handle military-political education and athletics. In reality, however, the Party entrusted the SA with totally inferior basks. The attitude of the Party towards the SA

became particularly evident in 1939, too. As the witness Jiittner has clearly stated, it was Bormann who sabotaged the decree of 30 January 1939, and who did not permit the premilitary training duties of the SA to be carried out. The witness Bock has informed us of the preparation and beginning of the premilitary and postmilitary training program. But he also stated that this task of the SA was terminated. Only the events of the war brought forth the so-called SA-Wehrmannschaften.

• Thus the SA was never able, as the Prosecution say, tom"participate feverishly in the preparations for war." It is absolutely impossible that, as the Prosecution claim, 25,000 officers were trained in SA schools. This claim was unimpeachably refuted by the testimony of the witnesses Jüttner and Bock. How unreliable the SA became in Bormann's eyes is shown by the fact that the Volkssturm was not built up from the SA. We learn from one of the affidavits submitted that the reason for this was the unreliability of the SA (Number General SA-67). The elimination of the SA is demonstrated by purely external evidence, if we recall that Rohm was Chief of Staff, Reich Leader, and Reich Minister; Lutze, Chiefof Staff and Reich Leader; and Schepmann, only Chief of Staff.
  • During the meetings of the Commission there was much discussion about the "Wehrsport" work of the SA. Nothing has been

more completely misunderstood than this. The SA is described bythe Prosecution as a semimilitary organization of volunteers, although the duties of the Wehrmacht and the SA were clearlyseparate f~om each other. Misunderstandings resulted primarily from the fact that there is no correct English translation of the word "Wehr." Nevertheless, this concept ought to be clarified, for the Prosecution itself submitted Document 2471-PS. In this document it says:

• "The SA, the exponent of the desire for military preparedness (Wehrwille). The SA claims to be the exponent of the desire for military preparedness (Wehrwille) and of the defensive. force (Wehrkraft) of the German people.
• "The emphasis on these qua-lities may have led to misunderstandings abroad, partly because foreign languages are unable

to translate correctly the terms 'Wehrwille' and 'Wehrkraft' but substitute for them the terms 'Kriegswille' or 'Kriegskraft,' while correctly 'Verteidigungswille' or 'Verteidigungskraft' (force) should be used. 'Sich wehren' is a linguistic derivation from 'Abwehr' (defense), therefore, 'der sich wehrende' (the one who is defending himself) in every case is the one who is attacked; and, therefore, the imputations of aggressive military intentions are plainly absurd."

• Ultimately, the Wehrmacht is the concentrated trained and directed force of all men able to defend themselves (wehrfahig). At no time did the SA have anything to do with that technical military training which is given in the Wehrmacht. Therefore, the SA athletic badge has been misjudged by the Prosecution. It is admitted that it was the purpose in awarding the SA athletic badge to train citizens fit for military service. Indeed it is also stated in the first document of 15 February 1935:
• "The new state demands a tough and hardy breed."
• In the regulation concerning the implementation of the document of 18 March 1937 we find the following:
  • "The training of the body in competitive sports is not a purpose in itself, but a means to strengthen German men spiritually and physically, to increase their efficiency, and to make them ready and able to serve for the maintenance of the nation even up to an advanced age."